| Date | Tue, 04 Jun 2013 19:24:15 +0200 | From | Willy Tarreau <> | Subject | [ 165/184] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key |
| |
2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ data
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]
On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do with e.g. auth keys when released.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> --- net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c index 905fda5..ca48660 100644 --- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c +++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c @@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) /* Final destructor for endpoint. */ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) { + int i; + SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return); /* Free up the HMAC transform. */ @@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep) sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue); sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr); + for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i) + memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE); + /* Remove and free the port */ if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash) sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk); -- 1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty
|