lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2013]   [Jun]   [4]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
Date
From
Subject[ 165/184] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key
2.6.32-longterm review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------
data

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]

On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
---
net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index 905fda5..ca48660 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -249,6 +249,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
+ int i;
+
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);

/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -271,6 +273,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);

+ for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
+ memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
+
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);
--
1.7.12.2.21.g234cd45.dirty




\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2013-06-05 02:01    [W:0.483 / U:8.532 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site