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SubjectRe: [PATCH v3 seccomp 2/5] seccomp/cache: Add "emulator" to check if filter is constant allow
On Wed, Sep 30, 2020 at 5:20 PM YiFei Zhu <zhuyifei1999@gmail.com> wrote:
> SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY will only operate on syscalls that do not
> access any syscall arguments or instruction pointer. To facilitate
> this we need a static analyser to know whether a filter will
> return allow regardless of syscall arguments for a given
> architecture number / syscall number pair. This is implemented
> here with a pseudo-emulator, and stored in a per-filter bitmap.
>
> Each common BPF instruction are emulated. Any weirdness or loading
> from a syscall argument will cause the emulator to bail.
>
> The emulation is also halted if it reaches a return. In that case,
> if it returns an SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the syscall is marked as good.
>
> Emulator structure and comments are from Kees [1] and Jann [2].
>
> Emulation is done at attach time. If a filter depends on more
> filters, and if the dependee does not guarantee to allow the
> syscall, then we skip the emulation of this syscall.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200923232923.3142503-5-keescook@chromium.org/
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAG48ez1p=dR_2ikKq=xVxkoGg0fYpTBpkhJSv1w-6BG=76PAvw@mail.gmail.com/
[...]
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 1ab22869a765..ff5289228ea5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ config X86
> select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES if MMU && COMPAT
> select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
> + select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY
> select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
> select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK

If you did the architecture enablement for X86 later in the series,
you could move this part over into that patch, that'd be cleaner.

> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
> index ae6b40cc39f4..f09c9e74ae05 100644
> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,37 @@ struct notification {
> struct list_head notifications;
> };
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_NR_ONLY
> +/**
> + * struct seccomp_cache_filter_data - container for cache's per-filter data
> + *
> + * Tis struct is ordered to minimize padding holes.

I think this comment can probably go away, there isn't really much
trickery around padding holes in the struct as it is now.

> + * @syscall_allow_default: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
> + * filter willalways allow the syscall, for the

nit: s/willalways/will always/

[...]
> +static void seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
> + void *bitmap, const void *bitmap_prev,
> + size_t bitmap_size, int arch)
> +{
> + struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog = sfilter->prog->orig_prog;
> + struct seccomp_data sd;
> + int nr;
> +
> + for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) {
> + if (bitmap_prev && !test_bit(nr, bitmap_prev))
> + continue;
> +
> + sd.nr = nr;
> + sd.arch = arch;
> +
> + if (seccomp_emu_is_const_allow(fprog, &sd))
> + set_bit(nr, bitmap);

set_bit() is atomic, but since we only do this at filter setup, before
the filter becomes globally visible, we don't need atomicity here. So
this should probably use __set_bit() instead.

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