| Date | Mon, 25 Apr 2011 22:04:53 +0200 | From | Willy Tarreau <> | Subject | [PATCH 141/173] ipv6: netfilter: ip6_tables: fix infoleak to userspace |
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2.6.27.59-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
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From: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
commit 6a8ab060779779de8aea92ce3337ca348f973f54 upstream.
Structures ip6t_replace, compat_ip6t_replace, and xt_get_revision are copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second was introduced in 3bc3fe5e (v2.6.25-rc1); the third is introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
--- net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c @@ -1323,6 +1323,7 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, void __user /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1855,6 +1856,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -2079,6 +2081,7 @@ do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; if (cmd == IP6T_SO_GET_REVISION_TARGET) target = 1;
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