Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 20 Apr 2010 21:25:46 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs |
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Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@mit.edu): > On Tue, Apr 20, 2010 at 8:37 AM, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > > On Mon, 2010-04-19 at 16:39 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > >> Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@mit.edu): > >> > 1. LSM transitions already scare me enough, and if anyone relies on > >> > them working in concert with setuid, then the mere act of separating > >> > them might break things, even if the "privileged" (by LSM) app in > >> > question is well-written. > >> > >> hmm... > >> > >> A good point. > > > > At least in the case of SELinux, context transitions upon execve are > > already disabled in the nosuid case, and Eric's patch updated the > > SELinux test accordingly. > > I don't see that code in current -linus, nor do I see where SELinux > affects dumpability. What's supposed to happen? I'm writing a patch > right now to clean this stuff up.
check out security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_bprm_set_creds()
if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
I assume that's it?
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