Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 21 Apr 2010 17:30:59 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 0/3] Taming execve, setuid, and LSMs |
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Quoting Andrew Lutomirski (luto@mit.edu): > So if we give up on changing nosuid, there are a couple of things we > might want to do: > > 1. A mode where execve acts like all filesystems are MNT_NOSUID. This > sounds like a bad idea (if nothing else, it will cause apps that use > selinux's exec_sid mechanism (runcon?) to silently malfunction).
I think at this point we've lost track of exactly what we're trying to do.
The goal, at least for myself and (I think) Eric, was to prevent certain changes in environment, initiated by an unprivileged user, from confusing setuid-root programs (initiated by the user).
A concrete example was the proposed disablenet feature, with which an unprivileged task can remove its ability to open any new network connections.
With that in mind, I think option 1 is actually the best option. I especially hate option 2 because of the resulting temptation to fudge with pE :) If you're going to fudge with pE, then IMO it MUST be done in a new securebits mode.
Now actually, re-reading my msg, given our original goal, I dare say that Andrew Morgan's approach of simply returning -EPERM for any app which tries to setuid or change privileges on exec just might be the sanest way, at least to start with.
-serge
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