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SubjectRe: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks
On Wed, 19 Apr 2006 02:40:25 EDT, Kyle Moffett said:
> Perhaps the SELinux model should be extended to handle (dir-inode,
> path-entry) pairs. For example, if I want to protect the /etc/shadow
> file regardless of what tool is used to safely modify it, I would set

Some of us think that the tools can protect /etc/shadow just fine on their
own, and are concerned with rogue software that abuses /etc/shadow without
bothering to safely modify it..

> up security as follows:
> o Protect the "/" and "/etc" directory inodes as usual under SELinux
> (with attributes on directory inodes).
> o Create pairs with (etc_inode,"shadow") and (etc_inode,"gshadow")
> and apply security attributes to those potentially nonexistent pairs.

*bzzt* wrong. Why should "gshadow" matter? (Think carefully about what
happens when a setUID program gets exploited and used to scribble on /etc/shadow -
black hats rarely bother to do locking and other such niceties....)

> I'm not terribly familiar with the exact internal semantics of
> SELinux, but that should provide a 90% solution (it fixes bind mounts

90% doesn't give the security guys warm-and-fuzzies....

> and namespaces). The remaining 2 issues are hardlinks and fd-
> passing. For hardlinks you don't care about other links to that
> data, you're concerned with protecting a particular filesystem
> location, not particular contents, so you just need to prevent _new_
> hardlinks to a protected (dir_inode, path_elem) pair, which doesn't
> seem very hard.

It's not. include/linux/security.h:

* @inode_link:
* Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
* @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link to the file.
* @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
* @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.

> For fd-passing, I don't know what to do. Perhaps
> nothing.


* @file_receive:
* This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
* to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
* @file contains the file structure being received.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.

Already a solved problem.

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