Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks | From | Arjan van de Ven <> | Date | Wed, 19 Apr 2006 09:44:05 +0200 |
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On Wed, 2006-04-19 at 02:40 -0400, Kyle Moffett wrote: > On Apr 18, 2006, at 21:48:56, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote: > >> With pathnames, there is an unbounded and unknown number of > >> effective security policies on the system, as there are an > >> unbounded and unknown number of ways of viewing the files via > >> pathnames. > > > > I agree that for traditional DAC and MAC (including the flavors > > supported by SELinux) inodes is the only way to go. SELinux is a > > traditional Trusted OS architecture and addresses the traditional > > Trusted OS issues. > > Perhaps the SELinux model should be extended to handle (dir-inode, > path-entry) pairs. For example, if I want to protect the /etc/shadow > file regardless of what tool is used to safely modify it, I would set > up security as follows: > > o Protect the "/" and "/etc" directory inodes as usual under SELinux > (with attributes on directory inodes).
in which namespace are these? And are they in a chroot? And what if someone makes /etd a symlink to /etc :) And what if I bind-mount something on top of /etc/shadow ? or unlink the file while holding it open? Should the security suddenly go away? There's no "directory" for this file anymore at that point. Or if I hardlink /etc/shadhow to /tmp/shad ... what then?
> o Create pairs with (etc_inode,"shadow") and (etc_inode,"gshadow") > and apply security attributes to those potentially nonexistent pairs
again see above ;_)
> . > > I'm not terribly familiar with the exact internal semantics of > SELinux, but that should provide a 90% solution (it fixes bind mounts > and namespaces).
how does this fix namespaces or even bind mounts? (or even symlinks for that matter)
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