Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 19 Apr 2006 06:41:06 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks |
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Quoting Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu (Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu): > On Wed, 19 Apr 2006 02:40:25 EDT, Kyle Moffett said: > > Perhaps the SELinux model should be extended to handle (dir-inode, > > path-entry) pairs. For example, if I want to protect the /etc/shadow > > file regardless of what tool is used to safely modify it, I would set > > Some of us think that the tools can protect /etc/shadow just fine on their > own, and are concerned with rogue software that abuses /etc/shadow without > bothering to safely modify it..
Can you rephrase this? I'm don't understand what you're saying...
My default response would have to be:
> own, and are concerned with rogue software that abuses /etc/shadow without > bothering to safely modify it..
rogue software like vi?
thanks, -serge - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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