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    SubjectRe: [PATCH] Undo some of the pseudo-security madness
    On Sat, 2007-01-20 at 17:37 +0300, Samium Gromoff wrote:
    > This patch removes the dropping of ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE upon execution of setuid
    > binaries.
    > Why? The answer consists of two parts:
    > Firstly, there are valid applications which need an unadulterated memory map.
    > Some of those which do their memory management, like lisp systems (like SBCL).
    > They try to achieve this by setting ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE and reexecuting themselves.

    this is a ... funny way of achieving this

    if an application for some reason wants some fixed address for a piece
    of memory there are other ways to do that.... (but to some degree all
    apps that can't take randomization broken; for example a glibc upgrade
    on a system will also move the address space around by virtue of being
    bigger or smaller etc etc)

    > [1]. See the excellent, 'Hackers Hut' by Andries Brouwer, which describes
    > how AS randomisation can be got around by the means of

    got a URL to this? If this is exploiting the fact that the vdso is at a
    fixed spot... it's no longer the case since quite a while.

    if you want to mail me at work (you don't), use arjan (at)
    Test the interaction between Linux and your BIOS via

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      Last update: 2007-01-21 03:35    [W:0.020 / U:21.984 seconds]
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