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SubjectRe: [Umbrella-devel] Re: Getting full path from dentry in LSM hooks
Horst von Brand wrote:
>>Also simple bufferoverflows in suid-root programs may be avoided.
> How?
You can (naturally) not avoid the attack and thereby the process from
crashing - but you can avoid the effects of it. E.g. if you restrict the
suid-root process form spawning new processes, it would not be able to
spawn a root shell, programs liks passwd and cdrecord would be good
candidates to this restriction.

>> The
>>simple way would to set the restriction "no fork", and thus if an
>>attacker tries to fork a (root) shell, this would be denied.
> A simple exec(2) will do. Or overwriting a file. Or... If you restrict all
> potentially dangerous operations, you have nothing useful left.
>> Another way
>>could be to heavily restrict access to the filesystem. If the program is
>>restricted from /var, the root shell spawned by the attack would not
>>have access either. (restrictions are enherited from parent to children).
> Just delete /var. Oops, it is there for a purpose...
Sure... but not all programs really need access to this. My calendar on
my PDA for one do not. It (restricting /var) was, as I hope you
guessed?, an example!

A cool thing is also, that if you restrict the init process from
accessing a secific directory, then all processes in the system will be
restricted from this. This will be utilized by Umbrella, to introduce
signed files (public key cryptography). The area of the public keys will
be protected by the kernel - simply by restricting Init from this location.

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