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SubjectRe: Direct access to hardware


On Wed, 26 Jul 2000, Alan Cox wrote:
?
> > If the system is secure, then adding sanity checking to the ATA code
> > makes no difference: nobody gets to do anything improper anyway.
>
> You aren't reading the capability stuff very carefully.

I _am_.

I agree with the CAP_SYS_RAWIO thing. Obviously. I think the current code
checks CAP_SYS_ADMIN, which is almost certainly just due to the fact that
that is what most of the old "super_user()" tests were changed into.

But you haven't followed the discussion: I disagree about the kernel
trying to parse the damn commands, because I don't think that the kernel
can (or should) know about all vendor-specific commands and whether they
are "evil" or not.

If somebody sends me a patch to change CAP_SYS_ADMIN into CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
I'll apply it in a jiffy.

Linus


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