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From
SubjectRe: Direct access to hardware
Date
In article <Pine.LNX.4.10.10007221822320.5862-100000@dax.joh.cam.ac.uk>,
James Sutherland <jas88@cam.ac.uk> wrote:
>
>So much for the "root is god" claims made earlier, then. What about iopl()
>and the like? IF capabilities can be used to block this (and similar), and
>Andre's "sanity checking" for ATA is added, then surely it *IS* possible
>to prevent root screwing the HDD (without replacing the kernel, at which
>point all bets are off, of course).

What's the point?

If the system is secure, then adding sanity checking to the ATA code
makes no difference: nobody gets to do anything improper anyway.

If the system is not secure, then adding sanity checking to the ATA code
makes no difference: people who could use the ATA thing can use other
things that are much more insidious.

The mechanism that everybody wants is _already_ there. It's called
"permissions". No new driver code necessary.

If those permissions do not work, then they don't work, and adding
last-minute band-aids makes no difference.

Just as a comparison, look at Windows. It takes the opposite approach:
it has no real seurity, but a LOT of band-aids to avoid the "obvious"
holes. Leaving it wide open.

Linus

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