Messages in this thread | | | Date | Mon, 13 Apr 1998 17:08:49 -0400 (EDT) | From | Greg Zornetzer <> | Subject | Re: Testers wanted: exorcised kmod.c: no more daemon! |
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On Mon, 13 Apr 1998, Craig Milo Rogers wrote:
[snipped] > Ugh! But this sounds like you'd just opened a wound in > security. I can imagine circumstances in which someone might want to > allow an anonymous FTP user to access data through a path that > requires an autoloaded kernel module, but loading kernel modules from > the anonymous FTP area itself??? Even if the kernel module files have > file protections that prevent access by the anonymous FTP server's > processes in normal conditions, you've created an outstanding way to > infect the kernel and take over the system if that first layer of > protection is broken. > Thing is, I can't think of a reason why you would want someone playing around as root in a chrooted environment anyway. If they're in an ftp area, they should just be accessing files - they shouldn't have any ability to mount drives, etc... If a person gets root in a chrooted environment (they need root to do anything that could execute a request_module), they can break out and get the "real" root. I don't see how this is really a big problem
Other way to handle things is to make sure that there's no /sbin/modprobe in the chroot'ed environment, then all request_modules executed from that environment will fail. As long as request_module can only be run by root, I think we're okay. Of course, that's only my opinion, I could be (probably am) wrong :)
Greg Zornetzer - gaz+@andrew.cmu.edu "Light shines brightest in the darkest night" http://www.contrib.andrew.cmu.edu/~gaz
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