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Subject[PATCH v2] x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load
Date
On vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load, respect user controlled
configuration for conditional IBPB and only attempt IBPB MSR when
switching between different guest vCPUs IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb,
which fixes a situation where the kernel will issue IBPB
unconditionally even when conditional IBPB is enabled.

If a user has spectre_v2_user mitigation enabled, in any
configuration, and the underlying processor supports X86_FEATURE_IBPB,
X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set and any calls to
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() will issue IBPB MSR.

Depending on the spectre_v2_user configuration, either
switch_mm_always_ibpb key or switch_mm_cond_ibpb key will be set.

Both switch_mm_always_ibpb and switch_mm_cond_ibpb are handled by
switch_mm() -> cond_mitigation(), which works well in cases where
switching vCPUs (i.e. switching tasks) also switches mm_struct;
however, this misses a paranoid case where user space may be running
multiple guests in a single process (i.e. single mm_struct).

This paranoid case is already covered by vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and
svm_vcpu_load; however, this is done by calling
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and thus the kernel
unconditionally issues IBPB if X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set.

Fix by using intermediary call to x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(), which
gates IBPB MSR IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb is true. This is useful for
security paranoid VMMs in either single process or multi-process VMM
configurations.

switch_mm_always_ibpb key is user controlled via spectre_v2_user and
will be true for the following configurations:
spectre_v2_user=on
spectre_v2_user=prctl,ibpb
spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb

Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
---
v1 -> v2:
- Addressed comments on approach from Sean.

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
index 5393babc0598..1ad140b17ad7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h
@@ -85,4 +85,19 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);

+/*
+ * Issue IBPB when switching guest vCPUs IFF if switch_mm_always_ibpb.
+ * Primarily useful for security paranoid (or naive) user space VMMs
+ * that may run multiple VMs within a single process.
+ * For multi-process VMMs, switching vCPUs, i.e. switching tasks,
+ * will also switch mm_structs and thus do IPBP via cond_mitigation();
+ * however, in the always_ibpb case, take a paranoid approach and issue
+ * IBPB on both switch_mm() and vCPU switch.
+ */
+static inline void x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(void)
+{
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+}
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 6296e1ebed1d..6aafb0279cbc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -68,8 +68,12 @@ u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
-/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in both switch_mm() and
+ * x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb().
+ * See notes on x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb() for KVM use case details.
+ */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(switch_mm_always_ibpb);

/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index bd4c64b362d2..fc08c94df888 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)

if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb();
}
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
__avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 04d170c4b61e..a8eed9b8221b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
* The L1 VMM can protect itself with retpolines, IBPB or IBRS.
*/
if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb();
}

if (!already_loaded) {
--
2.30.1 (Apple Git-130)
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