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SubjectRe: [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support
On Sun 2018-12-09 23:47:17, Josh Triplett wrote:
> On Sun, Dec 09, 2018 at 09:06:00PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
> ...
> > > > > The default permissions for the device are 600.
> > > >
> > > > Good. This does not belong to non-root.
> > >
> > > There are entirely legitimate use cases for using this as an
> > > unprivileged user. However, that'll be up to system and distribution
> > > policy, which can evolve over time, and it makes sense for the *initial*
> > > kernel permission to start out root-only and then adjust permissions via
> > > udev.
> >
> > Agreed.
> >
> > > Building a software certificate store. Hardening key-agent software like
> > > ssh-agent or gpg-agent. Building a challenge-response authentication
> > > system. Providing more assurance that your server infrastructure is
> > > uncompromised. Offloading computation to a system without having to
> > > fully trust that system.
> >
> > I think you can do the crypto stuff... as crypto already verifies the
> > results. But I don't think you can do the computation offload.
>
> You can, as long as you can do attestation.

You can not, because random errors are very easy to trigger for person
with physical access, as I explained in the part of email you
stripped.

> > > As one of many possibilities, imagine a distcc that didn't have to trust
> > > the compile nodes. The compile nodes could fail to return results at
> > > all, but they couldn't alter the results.
> >
> > distcc on untrusted nodes ... oh yes, that would be great.
> >
> > Except that you can't do it, right? :-).
> >
> > First, AFAICT it would be quite hard to get gcc to run under SGX. But
> > maybe you have spare month or three and can do it.
>
> Assuming you don't need to #include files, gcc seems quite simple to run
> in an enclave: data in, computation inside, data out.

So is there a plan to run dynamically linked binaries inside enclave?
Or maybe even python/shell scripts? It looked to me like virtual
memory will be "interesting" for enclaves.


Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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