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    SubjectRe: [PATCH v11 00/13] Intel SGX1 support
    On Sun, Dec 09, 2018 at 09:06:00PM +0100, Pavel Machek wrote:
    ...
    > > > > The default permissions for the device are 600.
    > > >
    > > > Good. This does not belong to non-root.
    > >
    > > There are entirely legitimate use cases for using this as an
    > > unprivileged user. However, that'll be up to system and distribution
    > > policy, which can evolve over time, and it makes sense for the *initial*
    > > kernel permission to start out root-only and then adjust permissions via
    > > udev.
    >
    > Agreed.
    >
    > > Building a software certificate store. Hardening key-agent software like
    > > ssh-agent or gpg-agent. Building a challenge-response authentication
    > > system. Providing more assurance that your server infrastructure is
    > > uncompromised. Offloading computation to a system without having to
    > > fully trust that system.
    >
    > I think you can do the crypto stuff... as crypto already verifies the
    > results. But I don't think you can do the computation offload.

    You can, as long as you can do attestation.

    > > As one of many possibilities, imagine a distcc that didn't have to trust
    > > the compile nodes. The compile nodes could fail to return results at
    > > all, but they couldn't alter the results.
    >
    > distcc on untrusted nodes ... oh yes, that would be great.
    >
    > Except that you can't do it, right? :-).
    >
    > First, AFAICT it would be quite hard to get gcc to run under SGX. But
    > maybe you have spare month or three and can do it.

    Assuming you don't need to #include files, gcc seems quite simple to run
    in an enclave: data in, computation inside, data out.

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