Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Mateusz Jurczyk <> | Subject | [PATCH] decnet: dn_rtmsg: Improve input length sanitization in dnrmg_receive_user_skb | Date | Wed, 7 Jun 2017 15:14:29 +0200 |
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Verify that the length of the socket buffer is sufficient to cover the entire nlh->nlmsg_len field before accessing that field for further input sanitization. If the client only supplies 1-3 bytes of data in sk_buff, then nlh->nlmsg_len remains partially uninitialized and contains leftover memory from the corresponding kernel allocation. Operating on such data may result in indeterminate evaluation of the nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) expression.
The bug was discovered by a runtime instrumentation designed to detect use of uninitialized memory in the kernel. The patch prevents this and other similar tools (e.g. KMSAN) from flagging this behavior in the future.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Jurczyk <mjurczyk@google.com> --- net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c index 1ed81ac6dd1a..26e020e9d415 100644 --- a/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c +++ b/net/decnet/netfilter/dn_rtmsg.c @@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ static inline void dnrmg_receive_user_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) { struct nlmsghdr *nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); - if (nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) + if (skb->len < sizeof(nlh->nlmsg_len) || + nlh->nlmsg_len < sizeof(*nlh) || + skb->len < nlh->nlmsg_len) return; if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) -- 2.13.1.508.gb3defc5cc-goog
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