Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | Ben Hutchings <> | Date | Tue, 28 May 2013 04:49:53 +0100 | Subject | [67/94] random: fix accounting race condition with lockless irq entropy_count update |
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3.2.46-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
commit 10b3a32d292c21ea5b3ad5ca5975e88bb20b8d68 upstream.
Commit 902c098a3663 ("random: use lockless techniques in the interrupt path") turned IRQ path from being spinlock protected into lockless cmpxchg-retry update.
That commit removed r->lock serialization between crediting entropy bits from IRQ context and accounting when extracting entropy on userspace read path, but didn't turn the r->entropy_count reads/updates in account() to use cmpxchg as well.
It has been observed, that under certain circumstances this leads to read() on /dev/urandom to return 0 (EOF), as r->entropy_count gets corrupted and becomes negative, which in turn results in propagating 0 all the way from account() to the actual read() call.
Convert the accounting code to be the proper lockless counterpart of what has been partially done by 902c098a3663.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.2: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> --- drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -889,16 +889,24 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto if (r->entropy_count / 8 < min + reserved) { nbytes = 0; } else { + int entropy_count, orig; +retry: + entropy_count = orig = ACCESS_ONCE(r->entropy_count); /* If limited, never pull more than available */ - if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= r->entropy_count / 8) - nbytes = r->entropy_count/8 - reserved; + if (r->limit && nbytes + reserved >= entropy_count / 8) + nbytes = entropy_count/8 - reserved; - if (r->entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved) - r->entropy_count -= nbytes*8; - else - r->entropy_count = reserved; + if (entropy_count / 8 >= nbytes + reserved) { + entropy_count -= nbytes*8; + if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) + goto retry; + } else { + entropy_count = reserved; + if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) + goto retry; + } - if (r->entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh) { + if (entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_thresh) { wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait); kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT); }
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