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    Subjectuser ns: arbitrary module loading
    The rearranging done for user ns has resulted in allowing arbitrary
    kernel module loading[1] (i.e. re-introducing a form of CVE-2011-1019)
    by what is assumed to be an unprivileged process.

    At present, it does look to require at least CAP_SETUID along the way
    to set up the uidmap (but things like the setuid helper newuidmap
    might soon start providing such a thing by default).

    It might be worth examining GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN in grsecurity, which
    examines module symbols to verify that request_module() for a
    filesystem only loads a module that defines "register_filesystem"
    (among other things).



    Kees Cook
    Chrome OS Security

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      Last update: 2013-03-02 03:01    [W:0.022 / U:24.844 seconds]
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