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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Sun, Nov 04, 2012 at 09:14:47AM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:

> I've actually had more than enough experience with automated installs
> over my career: they're either done by paying someone or using a
> provisioning system. In either case, they provision a static image and
> boot environment description, including EFI boot services variables, so
> you can provision a default MOK database if you want the ignition image
> not to pause on firstboot.

And now you've moved the attack vector to a copy of your provisioning
system instead.

> There is obviously the question of making the provisioning systems
> secure, but it's a separate one from making boot secure.

You don't get to punt on making the kernel secure by simply asserting
that some other system can be secure instead. The chain of trust needs
to go all the way back - if your security model is based on all installs
needing a physically present end user, all installs need a physically
present end user. That's not acceptable, so we need a different security
model.

--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org


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