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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
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On Sun, 2012-11-04 at 04:28 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 03, 2012 at 10:56:40PM +0000, James Bottomley wrote:
> > On Sat, 2012-11-03 at 13:46 +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> > > I... what? Our signed bootloader will boot our signed kernel without any
> > > physically present end-user involvement. We therefore need to make it
> > > as difficult as practically possible for an attacker to use our signed
> > > bootloader and our signed kernel as an attack vector against other
> > > operating systems, which includes worrying about hibernate and kexec. If
> > > people want to support this use case then patches to deal with that need
> > > to be present in the upstream kernel.
> >
> > Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> > first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could
> > easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> > it. Instead, we get all of this.
>
> Your definition of "Best practices" is "Automated installs are
> impossible"? Have you ever actually spoken to a user?

Are you sure you've spoken to the right users if you think they use a
distro boot system to do automated installs?

I've actually had more than enough experience with automated installs
over my career: they're either done by paying someone or using a
provisioning system. In either case, they provision a static image and
boot environment description, including EFI boot services variables, so
you can provision a default MOK database if you want the ignition image
not to pause on firstboot.

There is obviously the question of making the provisioning systems
secure, but it's a separate one from making boot secure.

James




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