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SubjectRe: [lxc-devel] Detecting if you are running in a container
[Replying to an oldish email...]

On 12.10.2011 20:59, Kay Sievers wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 10, 2011 at 23:41, Lennart Poettering <> wrote:
>> On Mon, 10.10.11 13:59, Eric W. Biederman ( wrote:
>>> - udev. All of the kernel interfaces for udev should be supported in
>>> current kernels. However I believe udev is useless because container
>>> start drops CAP_MKNOD so we can't do evil things. So I would
>>> recommend basing the startup of udev on presence of CAP_MKNOD.
>> Using CAP_MKNOD as test here is indeed a good idea. I'll make sure udev
>> in a systemd world makes use of that.
> Done.

Maybe CAP_MKNOD isn't actually a good idea, having in mind devtmpfs?

Without CAP_MKNOD, is devtmpfs still being populated internally by
the kernel, so that udev only needs to change ownership/permissions
and maintain symlinks in response to device changes, and perform
other duties (reacting to other types of events) normally?

In other words, provided devtmpfs works even without CAP_MKNOD,
I can easily imagine a whole system running without this capability
from the very early boot, with all functionality in place, including
udev and what not...

And having CAP_MKNOD in container may not be that bad either, while
cgroup device.permission is set correctly - some nodes may need to
be created still, even in an unprivileged containers. Who filters
out CAP_MKNOD during container startup (I don't see it in the code,
which only removes CAP_SYS_BOOT, and even that due to current
limitation), and which evil things can be done if it is not filtered?



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