Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 5 Oct 2011 10:54:39 +0300 | From | Adrian Bunk <> | Subject | Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust |
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On Tue, Oct 04, 2011 at 07:17:30PM -0400, Frank Ch. Eigler wrote: > Hi - > > On Wed, Oct 05, 2011 at 01:39:32AM +0300, Adrian Bunk wrote: > > > [...] But the semantics of PGP key signing is that you certify that > > you verified that a photo ID of that person matches the name on the > > key. [...] > > But that's begging the question. The semantics are what you want them > to be. Some keysigning parties take this super seriously, and maybe > with strangers there's some room for this. But in the end, when *I* > see a key with someone else's signature on it, there is no proof how > rigorously they investigated the person. The "reliable identity" part > of the web of trust is only one hop deep.
That is a rigid policy, but not the only one.
And it has practical limitations - "Key must be signed by H. Peter Anvin" might be a consequence for kernel.org.
What policy is now used at kernel.org now is exactly the question I asked in [1], and where I'm still waiting for an answer from hpa.
Other organizations like Debian have a clear and public policy on what is required for the user identification part for uploading to the archive [2], and I expect the same for kernel.org.
> - FChE
cu Adrian
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/10/3/362 [2] http://www.debian.org/devel/join/nm-step2
--
"Is there not promise of rain?" Ling Tan asked suddenly out of the darkness. There had been need of rain for many days. "Only a promise," Lao Er said. Pearl S. Buck - Dragon Seed
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