Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Wed, 3 Sep 2008 10:26:19 -0700 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | [patch 27/42] sctp: add verification checks to SCTP_AUTH_KEY option |
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2.6.26-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
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From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
[ Upstream commit 30c2235cbc477d4629983d440cdc4f496fec9246 ]
The structure used for SCTP_AUTH_KEY option contains a length that needs to be verfied to prevent buffer overflow conditions. Spoted by Eugene Teo <eteo@redhat.com>.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Eugene Teo <eugeneteo@kernel.sg> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
--- net/sctp/auth.c | 4 ++++ net/sctp/socket.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
--- a/net/sctp/auth.c +++ b/net/sctp/auth.c @@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ static struct sctp_auth_bytes *sctp_auth { struct sctp_auth_bytes *key; + /* Verify that we are not going to overflow INT_MAX */ + if ((INT_MAX - key_len) < sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes)) + return NULL; + /* Allocate the shared key */ key = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sctp_auth_bytes) + key_len, gfp); if (!key) --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3054,6 +3054,11 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(stru goto out; } + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } + asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, authkey->sca_assoc_id); if (!asoc && authkey->sca_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP)) { ret = -EINVAL; --
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