Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Wed, 3 Sep 2008 10:26:26 -0700 | From | Greg KH <> | Subject | [patch 30/42] sctp: correct bounds check in sctp_setsockopt_auth_key |
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2.6.26-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
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From: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
[ Upstream commit 328fc47ea0bcc27d9afa69c3ad6e52431cadd76c ]
The bonds check to prevent buffer overlflow was not exactly right. It still allowed overflow of up to 8 bytes which is sizeof(struct sctp_authkey).
Since optlen is already checked against the size of that struct, we are guaranteed not to cause interger overflow either.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
--- net/sctp/socket.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -3054,7 +3054,7 @@ static int sctp_setsockopt_auth_key(stru goto out; } - if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen) { + if (authkey->sca_keylength > optlen - sizeof(struct sctp_authkey)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } --
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