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SubjectRe: modules and securelevel
On Sat, 13 Jul 1996, Systemkennung Linux wrote:

> Hi,
> > Protecting the kernel against each module would cause a lot of unnecessary
> > overhead. Is there any good reason why modules should not be "trusted"
> > code?
> Because securelevel is for people that are not paranoid because they
> *know* that everybody is out to get them.

Modules have to be trusted code if you're going to load them after
securelevel has been changed. Because they can access any system memory
they want, so finding and changing the securelevel becomes an implementation
detail. For that matter, what good is securelevel as protection against a
program running in kernel space, i.e., the driver itself?


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