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Subject[tip:perf/urgent] tools headers: Sync x86 cpufeatures.h with the kernel sources
Commit-ID:  a20d23bb7b04bac27df096d6be4565a1ffdd1ec4
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a20d23bb7b04bac27df096d6be4565a1ffdd1ec4
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
AuthorDate: Fri, 1 Jun 2018 11:27:37 -0300
Committer: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
CommitDate: Fri, 1 Jun 2018 16:13:16 -0300

tools headers: Sync x86 cpufeatures.h with the kernel sources

To pick up changes found in these csets:

11fb0683493b x86/speculation: Add virtualized speculative store bypass disable support
d1035d971829 x86/cpufeatures: Add FEATURE_ZEN
52817587e706 x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle SSBD enumeration
7eb8956a7fec x86/cpufeatures: Disentangle MSR_SPEC_CTRL enumeration from IBRS
e7c587da1252 x86/speculation: Use synthetic bits for IBRS/IBPB/STIBP
9f65fb29374e x86/bugs: Rename _RDS to _SSBD
764f3c21588a x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if requested
24f7fc83b920 x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
0cc5fa00b0a8 x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
c456442cd3a5 x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass

The usage of this file in tools doesn't use the newly added X86_FEATURE_
defines:

CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o
CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/bench/perf-in.o
LD /tmp/build/perf/perf-in.o

Silencing this perf build warning:

Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h'

Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-mrwyauyov8c7s048abg26khg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 20 ++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 578793e97431..fb00a2fca990 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -198,7 +198,6 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2 ( 7*32+ 5) /* Cache Allocation Technology L2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3 ( 7*32+ 6) /* Code and Data Prioritization L3 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE ( 7*32+ 7) /* Effectively INVPCID && CR4.PCIDE=1 */
-
#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE ( 7*32+ 8) /* AMD HW-PState */
#define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK ( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
#define X86_FEATURE_SME ( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
@@ -207,13 +206,19 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD ( 7*32+13) /* "" AMD Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN ( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2 ( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
-
+#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL ( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SSBD ( 7*32+17) /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
#define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */
#define X86_FEATURE_SEV ( 7*32+20) /* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization */
-
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */
#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE ( 7*32+23) /* "" Disable Speculative Store Bypass. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD ( 7*32+24) /* "" AMD SSBD implementation via LS_CFG MSR */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+25) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB ( 7*32+26) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP ( 7*32+27) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ZEN ( 7*32+28) /* "" CPU is AMD family 0x17 (Zen) */

/* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
#define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
@@ -274,9 +279,10 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_CLZERO (13*32+ 0) /* CLZERO instruction */
#define X86_FEATURE_IRPERF (13*32+ 1) /* Instructions Retired Count */
#define X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR (13*32+ 2) /* Always save/restore FP error pointers */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB (13*32+12) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS (13*32+14) /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
-#define X86_FEATURE_STIBP (13*32+15) /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB (13*32+12) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS (13*32+14) /* "" Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP (13*32+15) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
+#define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD (13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */

/* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
#define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM (14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */
@@ -334,6 +340,7 @@
#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL (18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
#define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP (18*32+27) /* "" Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
#define X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES (18*32+29) /* IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR (Intel) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD (18*32+31) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */

/*
* BUG word(s)
@@ -363,5 +370,6 @@
#define X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN X86_BUG(14) /* CPU is affected by meltdown attack and needs kernel page table isolation */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1 X86_BUG(15) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 1 attack with conditional branches */
#define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2 X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
+#define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */

#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
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