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Subject[PATCH 1/4] syscalls: Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION for addr_limit_user_check
From: Thomas Garnier <>

Use CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION instead of BUG_ON to provide more flexibility
on address limit failures. By default, send a SIGKILL signal to kill the
current process preventing exploitation of a bad address limit.

Make the TIF_FSCHECK flag optional so ARM can use this function.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <>
include/linux/syscalls.h | 12 ++++++++----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 88951b795ee3..65e273aadada 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -219,21 +219,25 @@ static inline int is_syscall_trace_event(struct trace_event_call *tp_event)
} \
static inline long SYSC##name(__MAP(x,__SC_DECL,__VA_ARGS__))

* Called before coming back to user-mode. Returning to user-mode with an
* address limit different than USER_DS can allow to overwrite kernel memory.
static inline void addr_limit_user_check(void)
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_FSCHECK))

- BUG_ON(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS));
+ if (CHECK_DATA_CORRUPTION(!segment_eq(get_fs(), USER_DS),
+ "Invalid address limit on user-mode return"))
+ force_sig(SIGKILL, current);

asmlinkage long sys32_quotactl(unsigned int cmd, const char __user *special,
qid_t id, void __user *addr);
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