Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 10 Nov 2009 08:07:39 -0600 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | drop SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES? |
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Hey,
Just a probe to see what people think. I've seen two cases in about the last month where software was confounded by an assumption that prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_SOMETHING) would succeed if privileged, but not handling the fact that SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n means you can't do that.
Are we at the point yet where we feel we can get rid of the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n case?
Note that there is a boot arg no_file_caps which prevents file capabilities from being used if SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y. I think that's the case most users will care about, whereas the remaining differences between CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y and =n are that with CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y :
(1) certain security hooks (task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and task_setnice) do capability set comparisions, (2) it is possible to drop capabilities from the bounding set, (3) it is possible to set per-task securelevels, (4) and it is possible to add any capability to your inheritable set if you have CAP_SETPCAP.
Does anyone know of cases where CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n is still perceived as useful?
thanks, -serge
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