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SubjectRe: [PATCH 2/6] integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider
On Thu, 29 Jan 2009, Mimi Zohar wrote:

> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
> @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
> +# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
> +#
> +config IMA
> + bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
> + depends on ACPI
> + select SECURITYFS
> + select CRYPTO
> + select CRYPTO_HMAC
> + select CRYPTO_MD5
> + select CRYPTO_SHA1
> + select TCG_TPM
> + select TCG_TIS
> + help
> + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
> + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
> + values of executables and other sensitive system files,
> + as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
> + to change the contents of an important system file
> + being measured, we can tell.

Out of interest, do you know if the TCG has analyzed their use of SHA-1
in light of various attacks on the algorithm over the last few years?

The IETF has published analysis and recommendations relating to the use of
SHA-1 (and other cryptographic hashes) with IP protocols:

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4894.txt
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4270.txt

It would be useful to know if similar analysis has been performed for TPM.


- James
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>


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