Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 30 Jan 2009 11:07:03 +1100 (EST) | From | James Morris <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/6] integrity: IMA as an integrity service provider |
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On Thu, 29 Jan 2009, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig > @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ > +# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture > +# > +config IMA > + bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)" > + depends on ACPI > + select SECURITYFS > + select CRYPTO > + select CRYPTO_HMAC > + select CRYPTO_MD5 > + select CRYPTO_SHA1 > + select TCG_TPM > + select TCG_TIS > + help > + The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity > + Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash > + values of executables and other sensitive system files, > + as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages > + to change the contents of an important system file > + being measured, we can tell.
Out of interest, do you know if the TCG has analyzed their use of SHA-1 in light of various attacks on the algorithm over the last few years?
The IETF has published analysis and recommendations relating to the use of SHA-1 (and other cryptographic hashes) with IP protocols:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4894.txt http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4270.txt
It would be useful to know if similar analysis has been performed for TPM.
- James -- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
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