[lkml]   [2009]   [Jan]   [12]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
Messages in this thread
    SubjectRe: RFC: Network privilege separation.
    On Thu, 08 Jan 2009 10:43:05 GMT, Alan Cox said:

    > If you have the same uid then you can just use ptrace to drive another
    > task with that uid to do the creations for you. Chances are you can also
    > attack shared executable files (eg that uids .bashrc)
    > That to me says controlling network access is only useful as part of a
    > more fine grained and general purpose interface. We already have that
    > interface in the form of things like SELinux. We already have systems
    > actively using it to control stuff like which ports are accessed by some
    > services.

    Yes, the network access part *is* something that should be part of a more
    general interface. Having said that, we currently are lacking a way for a
    *general user* program to say "I'm all set up, and would like to disavow any
    other further resource access (except maybe r/o access as "other" to file

    It's pretty easy for stuff running as root to play setuid()/capability() games
    to throw away access rights. It's damned hard for mortal users to do it.

    [unhandled content-type:application/pgp-signature]
     \ /
      Last update: 2009-01-12 19:47    [W:0.020 / U:116.384 seconds]
    ©2003-2017 Jasper Spaans. hosted at Digital OceanAdvertise on this site