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SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/3] core_pattern: cleaned up repost/continuing post of core_pattern enhancements
Neil Horman wrote:
> Ok, here we go
>
> As promised, I'm reposting the core_pattern enhancements I've done over the past
> few days. These three patches replace and conintue the work contained in the
> following patches, and can replace them:
> update-coredump-path-in-kernel-to-not-check-coredump-rlim-if-core_pattern-is-a-pipe.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-fix.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-sparc64-fix.patch
> allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-sparc64-fix.patch
[...]

You may want to improve your patches with style-related changes, including
removing trailing spaces, using tabs instead of spaces, and defining pointers
like char *ptr instead of char * ptr.

Also, it is probably good to think how we can "drop privileges" while piping
the core dump output to an external program. A malicious user can potentially
use it as a possible backdoor since anything that is executed by "|program" will
be executed with root privileges.

Eugene
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