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    SubjectRe: [PATCH 0/3] core_pattern: cleaned up repost/continuing post of core_pattern enhancements
    Neil Horman wrote:
    > Ok, here we go
    > As promised, I'm reposting the core_pattern enhancements I've done over the past
    > few days. These three patches replace and conintue the work contained in the
    > following patches, and can replace them:
    > update-coredump-path-in-kernel-to-not-check-coredump-rlim-if-core_pattern-is-a-pipe.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-fix.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-sparc64-fix.patch
    > allow-individual-core-dump-methods-to-be-unlimited-when-sending-to-a-pipe-fix-2-sparc64-fix.patch

    You may want to improve your patches with style-related changes, including
    removing trailing spaces, using tabs instead of spaces, and defining pointers
    like char *ptr instead of char * ptr.

    Also, it is probably good to think how we can "drop privileges" while piping
    the core dump output to an external program. A malicious user can potentially
    use it as a possible backdoor since anything that is executed by "|program" will
    be executed with root privileges.

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      Last update: 2007-07-29 12:43    [W:0.039 / U:208.848 seconds]
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