Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: AppArmor Security Goal | From | Andi Kleen <> | Date | Sat, 10 Nov 2007 22:04:35 +0100 |
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Crispin Cowan <crispin@crispincowan.com> writes:
The document should be a good base for a merge.
> * A confined process can operate on a file descriptor passed to it > by an unconfined process, even if it manipulates a file not in the > confined process's profile. To block this attack, confine the > process that passed the file descriptor.
That is the only thing that tripped me up a bit while reading the document. Can you expand a bit on the reasons why the fd is not rechecked in the context of the target process? Best do it in a new version of the document.
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