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SubjectRe: [Announcement] "Exec Shield", new Linux security feature
On Fri, 2 May 2003, Ingo Molnar wrote:

>
> We are pleased to announce the first publically available source code
> release of a new kernel-based security feature called the "Exec Shield",
> for Linux/x86. The kernel patch (against 2.4.21-rc1, released under the
> GPL/OSL) can be downloaded from:
>
> http://redhat.com/~mingo/exec-shield/
>
> The exec-shield feature provides protection against stack, buffer or
> function pointer overflows, and against other types of exploits that rely
> on overwriting data structures and/or putting code into those structures.
> The patch also makes it harder to pass in and execute the so-called
> 'shell-code' of exploits. The patch works transparently, ie. no
> application recompilation is necessary.

[ very cool stuff ]

Ingo, do you want protection against shell code injection ? Have the
kernel to assign random stack addresses to processes and they won't be
able to guess the stack pointer to place the jump. I use a very simple
trick in my code :

#define MAX_STKSHIFT 1024

struct thrunner {
int (*proc)(void *);
void *data;
}
static int thread_runner(void *data) {
struct thrunner *thr = data;
alloca(myrand(MAX_STKSHIFT));
return thr->proc(thr->data);
}
int my_thread_create(int (*proc)(void *), void *data) {
struct thrunner *thr;
...
thr->proc = proc;
thr->data = data;
pthread_create(..., thread_runner, thr, ... );
...
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
mysrand();
...
}
Same thing can be done for non threaded programs :

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
mysrand();
alloca(myrand(MAX_STKSHIFT));
return real_main(argc, argv);
}

Yes, there's still the possibility that an attacker get lucky ( this get
lower increasing MAX_STKSHIFT ) and yes you waste some stack space. But,
oh well, it works w/out any kernel modification and it's portable on all
systems that have alloca().




- Davide

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