Messages in this thread | | | From | John Bradford <> | Subject | Re: [Announcement] "Exec Shield", new Linux security feature | Date | Fri, 2 May 2003 19:29:38 +0100 (BST) |
| |
> > > Ingo, do you want protection against shell code injection ? Have the > > > kernel to assign random stack addresses to processes and they won't be > > > able to guess the stack pointer to place the jump. I use a very simple > > > trick in my code : > > > > stack randomisation is already present in the kernel, in the form of > > cacheline coloring for HT cpus... > > we could make it even more prominent than just coloring, to introduce the > kind of variability that Davide's approach introduces. It has to be a > separate patch obviously. This would further reduce the chance that a > remote attack that has to guess the stack would succeed on a random box.
Slightly off-topic, but does anybody know whether IA64 or x86-64 allow you to make the stack non-executable in the same way you can on SPARC?
John. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |