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In article <Pine.GSO.4.21.0201190627310.3523-100000@weyl.math.psu.edu>, Alexander Viro <viro@math.psu.edu> wrote: >On Sat, 19 Jan 2002, Miquel van Smoorenburg wrote: >> This could be hacked around ofcourse in fs/namei.c, so I tried >> it for fun. And indeed, with a minor correction it works: >> >> % perl flink.pl >> Success. >> >> I now have a flink-test2.txt file. That is pretty cool ;) > >It's also a security hole. How is linking back a file into the normal namespace anymore a security hole as having it under /proc or keeping an fd to it open? I've searched google on the subject but couldn't find anything relevant. Yes this has been proposed a few times for both BSD and Linux, often in combination with "unattached open" (O_NULL or somesuch) that opens a file with a nlink count of 0. It's supposed to be a perfect way to create a new file and link it atomically into place without creating (named) tempfiles. Mike. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/ | |||||||||
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