Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 05 Aug 1998 00:01:57 +0200 | From | Peter Enderborg <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] [SECURITY] suid procs exec'd with bad 0,1,2 fds |
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Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Tue, 4 Aug 1998, Alan Cox wrote: > > > > Actually a _lot_ of people run the non-excutable stack and related > > patches. They don't break anything, > > They DO break things. There are languages that by design use the stack for > trampolines etc, and at least if somebody applies the unofficial patch > they have themselves to blame. > > The "stack is non-executable" patch is not going to be in the standard > kernel, with or without a config option. > > Linus >
Is that realy necisary ?! My opinion is that security is of grate matter for the Linux comunity,. what about have some flags for it ? A system call line chroot() but called no_stackexec() or something like that. This gives the userlevel programmers the oprtunity to fix there problems. And with a LD_PRELOAD a this could be called to almost any binary that is written in C-like language. But there is other things to. Is there any reason why we cant have enuc processes ? Processes that can't have child in the same way as chroot() It a oneway ticket. Or maybe litte smarter with an argument. that is "number of child that can have child" ala ttl. The function should modify all the exec and clone function in some smart way... Is there any good reason not to have it ?
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-- foo!
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