Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: suser() -> capable() for linux/* | Date | Thu, 23 Apr 1998 18:19:50 +0200 | From | David Woodhouse <> |
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Looking at the capabilities patches, I can't help wondering if they are granular enough.
For example, I want certain users to be able to manipulate my second network card, but not the main one. I certainly don't want them to have all the privileges that CAP_NET_ADMIN gives.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is even worse - I'll want my own user to be able to set up the frame buffer address on the TV card, but that's all.
I'd also like a CAP_NETWORK, to control _any_ network access, ideally with the possibility of allowing traffic only on certain devices, although that's not quite feasible ATM. With the SO_BINDTODEVICE code in place, I suppose one could enforce "only loopback", though.
Perhaps such granularity could be achieved by adding an opaque field to the cap_t, which could be to further qualify the capability, for example in the case of CAP_SYS_ADMIN it could contain a dev_t & mask to specify the device(s) to which access is permitted.
---- ---- ---- David Woodhouse, Robinson College, CB3 9AN, England. (+44) 0976 658355 Dave@imladris.demon.co.uk http://www.imladris.demon.co.uk finger pgp@dwmw2.robinson.cam.ac.uk for PGP key.
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