Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 10 Jan 1998 03:15:31 +0100 | From | Andrej Presern <> | Subject | Re: /proc/*/mem and mmap() security hole? |
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linux kernel account wrote: > > On 9 Jan 1998, Benny Amorsen wrote: > > > >>>>> "AP" == Andrej Presern <andrejp@luz.fe.uni-lj.si> writes: > > > > AP> It makes me wonder if there is a way a process can prevent some > > AP> other process from accessing any of its address space. Not being > > AP> able to do so would open up a potential security hole that would > > AP> enable the superuser to extract the information that is supposed > > AP> to stay private by mmap()ing the address space of an intresting > > AP> process into its own and examining (and possibly modifying) it. > > > > Would people please stop trying to protect a unix system from root? > > Root can patch the kernel on the fly to get around any "protection". > > No, actually, with a proper securelevel implimentation root can't. > What happened to the patches for securelevel being a bitmap, and the > ability to chmod /proc/[pid] dirs to hide their processes? > > Both of those were quite execlent, and are on my top 10 list.. :)
It would be nice to have this in the kernel.
Btw, does the current mmap() implementation work sufficiently good when mmaping /proc/pid/mem (or does it work at all)? I saw some remarks in the man page but have no idea whether this has actually been implemented by now (and is safe to use) or not.
Andrej
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