Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 9 Jan 1998 19:52:53 -0500 (EST) | From | linux kernel account <> | Subject | Re: /proc/*/mem and mmap() security hole? |
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On 9 Jan 1998, Benny Amorsen wrote:
> >>>>> "AP" == Andrej Presern <andrejp@luz.fe.uni-lj.si> writes: > > AP> It makes me wonder if there is a way a process can prevent some > AP> other process from accessing any of its address space. Not being > AP> able to do so would open up a potential security hole that would > AP> enable the superuser to extract the information that is supposed > AP> to stay private by mmap()ing the address space of an intresting > AP> process into its own and examining (and possibly modifying) it. > > Would people please stop trying to protect a unix system from root? > Root can patch the kernel on the fly to get around any "protection".
No, actually, with a proper securelevel implimentation root can't. What happened to the patches for securelevel being a bitmap, and the ability to chmod /proc/[pid] dirs to hide their processes?
Both of those were quite execlent, and are on my top 10 list.. :)
> > > Benny
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