Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: Some Concrete AppArmor Questions - was Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Fri, 28 Apr 2006 09:02:08 -0400 |
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On Thu, 2006-04-27 at 16:44 -0700, Chris Wright wrote: > * Karl MacMillan (kmacmillan@tresys.com) wrote: > > While this is example of labeling issues with SELinux is correct for a > > standard targeted policy, it does not represent an intrinsic problem > > with the SELinux mechanism. A policy that has the appropriate > > specialized domains for reading /etc/shadow and corresponding > > type_transition rules can prevent this mislabeling. The solution may not > > be very satisfying because of the changes it makes to how systems are > > typically administered, but at least it does exist within the SELinux > > model. The same cannot be said of the problems introduced by path-based > > mechanisms. > > Indeed, I tried to be quite specific to targeted policy. The point > is that having unconfined domains makes it very challenging to reason > about the security of the system. So, while comprehensive strict policy > addresses that, it's also what nearly guarantees turning security off > for most normal general purpose machines ;-)
But this is a temporary situation, until we have the infrastructure and tools developed to make MAC truly manageable by typical end users. Not an inherent problem.
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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