Messages in this thread Patch in this message |  | | From | Sara Venkatesh <> | | Subject | [PATCH] RDMA/srpt: fix integer overflow in immediate data length check | | Date | Mon, 4 May 2026 01:00:36 -0700 |
| |
imm_buf->len is a user-controlled uint32_t received from the network. Adding it to imm_data_offset without overflow checking allows a malicious initiator to send len=0xFFFFFFFF, causing req_size to wrap around to a small value, bypassing the bounds check, and subsequently passing a ~4GB length to sg_init_one().
Use check_add_overflow() to detect wrapping before the comparison.
Fixes: 5dabcd0456d7 ("RDMA/srpt: Add support for immediate data") Reported-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) <carlos.bilbao@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sara Venkatesh <sarajvenkatesh@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Bilbao (Lambda) <carlos.bilbao@kernel.org> --- drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c index 9aec5d80117f..f66cfd70c263 100644 --- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/srpt/ib_srpt.c @@ -1129,9 +1129,10 @@ static int srpt_get_desc_tbl(struct srpt_recv_ioctx *recv_ioctx, struct srp_imm_buf *imm_buf = srpt_get_desc_buf(srp_cmd); void *data = (void *)srp_cmd + imm_data_offset; uint32_t len = be32_to_cpu(imm_buf->len); - uint32_t req_size = imm_data_offset + len; + uint32_t req_size; - if (req_size > srp_max_req_size) { + if (check_add_overflow((uint32_t)imm_data_offset, len, &req_size) || + req_size > srp_max_req_size) { pr_err("Immediate data (length %d + %d) exceeds request size %d\n", imm_data_offset, len, srp_max_req_size); return -EINVAL; -- 2.43.0
|  |