Messages in this thread Patch in this message |  | | From | Maoyi Xie <> | | Subject | [PATCH net v6] ipv6: flowlabel: enforce per-netns limit for unprivileged callers | | Date | Sat, 2 May 2026 23:09:18 +0800 |
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fl_size, fl_ht and ip6_fl_lock in net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c are file scope and shared across netns. mem_check() reads fl_size to decide whether to deny non-CAP_NET_ADMIN callers; capable() runs against init_user_ns, so an unprivileged user in any non-init userns can push fl_size past FL_MAX_SIZE - FL_MAX_SIZE/4 and starve every other unprivileged userns on the host.
Add struct netns_ipv6::flowlabel_count, bumped and decremented next to fl_size in fl_intern, ip6_fl_gc and ip6_fl_purge. The new field is placed in the existing 4-byte hole after ipmr_seq, so struct netns_ipv6 stays the same size on 64-bit builds.
Bump FL_MAX_SIZE from 4096 to 8192. It has been 4096 since the file was added; machines and connection counts have grown.
mem_check() folds an extra per-netns ceiling into the existing non-CAP_NET_ADMIN conditional. The ceiling is half of the total budget that unprivileged callers have ever been able to use, i.e. (FL_MAX_SIZE - FL_MAX_SIZE/4) / 2 = 3072 entries. With FL_MAX_SIZE doubled, this preserves the original per-user reach (~3K, what an unprivileged caller could already obtain before this change) while forcing an attacker to spread allocations across at least two netns to exhaust the global non-CAP_NET_ADMIN budget.
CAP_NET_ADMIN against init_user_ns still bypasses both caps.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Suggested-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+ Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyi.xie@ntu.edu.sg> --- v6 (this submission, addressing v5 review by Willem): - Rebased onto current net (resolves the conflict on include/net/netns/ipv6.h that v5 hit. ipmr_seq is now atomic_t but remains 4 bytes, so flowlabel_count still fills the 4-byte hole after it). - Restored fl_free() to its original position in both ip6_fl_gc() and ip6_fl_purge(). v5 had moved fl_free() after the new atomic_dec() to avoid the use-after-free on fl->fl_net. v6 instead caches fl->fl_net into a local before fl_free() in ip6_fl_gc(), and uses the net argument already in scope in ip6_fl_purge(). v5: replaced the per-netns ceiling FL_MAX_SIZE/8 with the computed unpriv_user_limit = (FL_MAX_SIZE - FL_MAX_SIZE/4)/2, which evaluates to 3072. v4's FL_MAX_SIZE/8 = 1024 would have reduced the per-user budget below the ~3K an unprivileged caller could already obtain before any of this work, defeating the reason FL_MAX_SIZE was doubled in the first place. v4: addressed Willem's v3 review on netdev. Dropped the flowlabel_has_excl cacheline argument in favour of "fills the existing 4-byte hole after ipmr_seq", and reordered atomic_dec(&...flowlabel_count) to sit immediately after atomic_dec(&fl_size) in ip6_fl_gc and ip6_fl_purge. v3: addressed Willem's review on the private security@ thread. Merged FL_MAX_SIZE doubling, dropped test data, moved flowlabel_count near ipmr_seq, inlined fl->fl_net in ip6_fl_gc. v2: per-netns counter + cap, sent to security@ as a 2-patch series. v1: fix-shape sketch in original disclosure.
include/net/netns/ipv6.h | 1 + net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h index 499e42881..ef698f5fa 100644 --- a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h +++ b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h @@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ struct netns_ipv6 { struct fib_notifier_ops *notifier_ops; struct fib_notifier_ops *ip6mr_notifier_ops; atomic_t ipmr_seq; + atomic_t flowlabel_count; struct { struct hlist_head head; spinlock_t lock; diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c index c92f98c6f..28e43718d 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_flowlabel.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ /* FL hash table */ #define FL_MAX_PER_SOCK 32 -#define FL_MAX_SIZE 4096 +#define FL_MAX_SIZE 8192 #define FL_HASH_MASK 255 #define FL_HASH(l) (ntohl(l)&FL_HASH_MASK) @@ -161,9 +161,12 @@ static void ip6_fl_gc(struct timer_list *unused) fl->expires = ttd; ttd = fl->expires; if (time_after_eq(now, ttd)) { + struct net *net = fl->fl_net; + *flp = fl->next; fl_free(fl); atomic_dec(&fl_size); + atomic_dec(&net->ipv6.flowlabel_count); continue; } if (!sched || time_before(ttd, sched)) @@ -197,6 +200,7 @@ static void __net_exit ip6_fl_purge(struct net *net) *flp = fl->next; fl_free(fl); atomic_dec(&fl_size); + atomic_dec(&net->ipv6.flowlabel_count); continue; } flp = &fl->next; @@ -245,6 +249,7 @@ static struct ip6_flowlabel *fl_intern(struct net *net, fl->next = fl_ht[FL_HASH(fl->label)]; rcu_assign_pointer(fl_ht[FL_HASH(fl->label)], fl); atomic_inc(&fl_size); + atomic_inc(&net->ipv6.flowlabel_count); spin_unlock_bh(&ip6_fl_lock); rcu_read_unlock(); return NULL; @@ -464,6 +469,9 @@ fl_create(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct in6_flowlabel_req *freq, static int mem_check(struct sock *sk) { + const int unpriv_total_limit = FL_MAX_SIZE - (FL_MAX_SIZE / 4); + const int unpriv_user_limit = unpriv_total_limit / 2; + struct net *net = sock_net(sk); int room = FL_MAX_SIZE - atomic_read(&fl_size); struct ipv6_fl_socklist *sfl; int count = 0; @@ -478,7 +486,9 @@ static int mem_check(struct sock *sk) if (room <= 0 || ((count >= FL_MAX_PER_SOCK || - (count > 0 && room < FL_MAX_SIZE/2) || room < FL_MAX_SIZE/4) && + (count > 0 && room < FL_MAX_SIZE/2) || + room < FL_MAX_SIZE/4 || + atomic_read(&net->ipv6.flowlabel_count) >= unpriv_user_limit) && !capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))) return -ENOBUFS; -- 2.34.1
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