Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Thu, 16 Apr 2026 19:35:44 -0700 | | From | Dan Williams <> | | Subject | Re: [RFC v3 00/27] lib: Rust implementation of SPDM |
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Alistair Francis wrote: > On Thu, Feb 12, 2026 at 3:56 PM <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote: [..] > > > > So this is where it will collide with TSM that also emits an > > authenticated attribute. See Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-pci. > > > > The rough plan Lukas and I worked out is that switching between TSM and > > CMA based authentication would use sysfs visibility to coordinate. I.e. > > TSM to CMA conversion hides the TSM "authenticated" attribute and > > unhides the CMA attribute of the same name. > > That seems straightforward and is already documented upstream as well, > so that's pretty easy.
Later in the thread I proposed an alternative that instead of supporting 2 flavors of uapi through "authenticated", instead implement CMA as another TSM driver [1].
[1]: http://lore.kernel.org/69976d7d39c60_2f4a1009@dwillia2-mobl4.notmuch
> > The most significant unsolved point of contention between TSM and CMA is > > the policy on when authentication is mandated and the driver probe > > policy. The proposed model for enforcing device security for > > Confidential Computing is make it completely amenable to userspace > > policy. Draft details here [2] to be refreshed "soon" when I send out > > the next version of that. > > > > [2]: http://lore.kernel.org/20250827035259.1356758-6-dan.j.williams@intel.com > > CMA will eventually need to support some sort of drive probe policy as > well, but that can wait until later and isn't going to be dealt with > in this series.
Makes sense, and Greg wants to a see a more universal "device trust" mechanism for this. This also means CMA as a TSM driver gets that mechanism "for free" when the PCI/TSM effort moves it forward.
> > To be clear I am ok if there is an incremental option to have auto_cma > > and/or auto_tsm that arranges for authentication or link encryption to > > happen without asking. I take issue with auto_cma being the only hard > > coded option. > > I have been working through all of the comments and discussions and I > think I have addressed everything, except for this one. > > To summerise, is the high level issue is how do we know if we should > use CMA or TSM? > > Do you have any more thoughts on this?
So most of the thinking is in that [1] above, and the new mechanism would just be to auto-connect to the first TSM driver that appears, or auto-connect to the TSM driver with the most capbility. For example, auto-connect to the CMA-TSM at initial discovery, switch to Platform-TSM if the device additionally supports IDE.
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