Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Mon, 11 Mar 2024 16:07:42 +0000 | | Subject | Re: CVE-2023-52514: x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot | | From | Sean Christopherson <> |
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On Mon, Mar 11, 2024, Lee Jones wrote: > On Mon, 11 Mar 2024, Michal Hocko wrote: > > > On Sat 02-03-24 22:52:59, Greg KH wrote: > > > Description > > > =========== > > > > > > In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: > > > > > > x86/reboot: VMCLEAR active VMCSes before emergency reboot > > > > > > VMCLEAR active VMCSes before any emergency reboot, not just if the kernel > > > may kexec into a new kernel after a crash. Per Intel's SDM, the VMX > > > architecture doesn't require the CPU to flush the VMCS cache on INIT. If > > > an emergency reboot doesn't RESET CPUs, cached VMCSes could theoretically > > > be kept and only be written back to memory after the new kernel is booted, > > > i.e. could effectively corrupt memory after reboot. > > > > > > Opportunistically remove the setting of the global pointer to NULL to make > > > checkpatch happy. > > > > > > The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2023-52514 to this issue. > > > > I do not really see the security aspect of this fix. Guests systems > > shouldn't be able to trigger host reboot nor any untrusted entity should > > on the host either or this would be a serious security hole.
And not just any reboot either, this only comes into play with something like `reboot -f`. Not to mention the impact of the bug is ridiculously theroetical (I didn't tag the patch for stable@ for a reason).
> > Or am I missing something? > > Thanks for reporting. > > If Sean and/or Paolo agree, we can revoke the CVE for you.
Please do.
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