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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 03/13] ceph: handle idmapped mounts in create_request_message()
On Thu, Jun 1, 2023 at 4:29 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 6/1/23 00:32, Aleksandr Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> > On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 5:52 AM Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 5/24/23 23:33, Alexander Mikhalitsyn wrote:
> >>> From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
> >>>
> >>> Inode operations that create a new filesystem object such as ->mknod,
> >>> ->create, ->mkdir() and others don't take a {g,u}id argument explicitly.
> >>> Instead the caller's fs{g,u}id is used for the {g,u}id of the new
> >>> filesystem object.
> >>>
> >>> Cephfs mds creation request argument structures mirror this filesystem
> >>> behavior. They don't encode a {g,u}id explicitly. Instead the caller's
> >>> fs{g,u}id that is always sent as part of any mds request is used by the
> >>> servers to set the {g,u}id of the new filesystem object.
> >>>
> >>> In order to ensure that the correct {g,u}id is used map the caller's
> >>> fs{g,u}id for creation requests. This doesn't require complex changes.
> >>> It suffices to pass in the relevant idmapping recorded in the request
> >>> message. If this request message was triggered from an inode operation
> >>> that creates filesystem objects it will have passed down the relevant
> >>> idmaping. If this is a request message that was triggered from an inode
> >>> operation that doens't need to take idmappings into account the initial
> >>> idmapping is passed down which is an identity mapping and thus is
> >>> guaranteed to leave the caller's fs{g,u}id unchanged.,u}id is sent.
> >>>
> >>> The last few weeks before Christmas 2021 I have spent time not just
> >>> reading and poking the cephfs kernel code but also took a look at the
> >>> ceph mds server userspace to ensure I didn't miss some subtlety.
> >>>
> >>> This made me aware of one complication to solve. All requests send the
> >>> caller's fs{g,u}id over the wire. The caller's fs{g,u}id matters for the
> >>> server in exactly two cases:
> >>>
> >>> 1. to set the ownership for creation requests
> >>> 2. to determine whether this client is allowed access on this server
> >>>
> >>> Case 1. we already covered and explained. Case 2. is only relevant for
> >>> servers where an explicit uid access restriction has been set. That is
> >>> to say the mds server restricts access to requests coming from a
> >>> specific uid. Servers without uid restrictions will grant access to
> >>> requests from any uid by setting MDS_AUTH_UID_ANY.
> >>>
> >>> Case 2. introduces the complication because the caller's fs{g,u}id is
> >>> not just used to record ownership but also serves as the {g,u}id used
> >>> when checking access to the server.
> >>>
> >>> Consider a user mounting a cephfs client and creating an idmapped mount
> >>> from it that maps files owned by uid 1000 to be owned uid 0:
> >>>
> >>> mount -t cephfs -o [...] /unmapped
> >>> mount-idmapped --map-mount 1000:0:1 /idmapped
> >>>
> >>> That is to say if the mounted cephfs filesystem contains a file "file1"
> >>> which is owned by uid 1000:
> >>>
> >>> - looking at it via /unmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> >>> (One can think of this as the on-disk value.)
> >>> - looking at it via /idmapped/file1 will report it as owned by uid 0
> >>>
> >>> Now, consider creating new files via the idmapped mount at /idmapped.
> >>> When a caller with fs{g,u}id 1000 creates a file "file2" by going
> >>> through the idmapped mount mounted at /idmapped it will create a file
> >>> that is owned by uid 1000 on-disk, i.e.:
> >>>
> >>> - looking at it via /unmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 1000
> >>> - looking at it via /idmapped/file2 will report it as owned by uid 0
> >>>
> >>> Now consider an mds server that has a uid access restriction set and
> >>> only grants access to requests from uid 0.
> >>>
> >>> If the client sends a creation request for a file e.g. /idmapped/file2
> >>> it will send the caller's fs{g,u}id idmapped according to the idmapped
> >>> mount. So if the caller has fs{g,u}id 1000 it will be mapped to {g,u}id
> >>> 0 in the idmapped mount and will be sent over the wire allowing the
> >>> caller access to the mds server.
> >>>
> >>> However, if the caller is not issuing a creation request the caller's
> >>> fs{g,u}id will be send without the mount's idmapping applied. So if the
> >>> caller that just successfully created a new file on the restricted mds
> >>> server sends a request as fs{g,u}id 1000 access will be refused. This
> >>> however is inconsistent.
> >>>
> >>> From my perspective the root of the problem lies in the fact that
> >>> creation requests implicitly infer the ownership from the {g,u}id that
> >>> gets sent along with every mds request.
> >>>
> >>> I have thought of multiple ways of addressing this problem but the one I
> >>> prefer is to give all mds requests that create a filesystem object a
> >>> proper, separate {g,u}id field entry in the argument struct. This is,
> >>> for example how ->setattr mds requests work.
> >>>
> >>> This way the caller's fs{g,u}id can be used consistenly for server
> >>> access checks and is separated from the ownership for new filesystem
> >>> objects.
> >>>
> >>> Servers could then be updated to refuse creation requests whenever the
> >>> {g,u}id used for access checking doesn't match the {g,u}id used for
> >>> creating the filesystem object just as is done for setattr requests on a
> >>> uid restricted server. But I am, of course, open to other suggestions.
> >>>
> >>> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
> >>> Cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
> >>> Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
> >>> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
> >>> ---
> >>> fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
> >>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> >>> index 810c3db2e369..e4265843b838 100644
> >>> --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> >>> +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> >>> @@ -2583,6 +2583,8 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
> >>> void *p, *end;
> >>> int ret;
> >>> bool legacy = !(session->s_con.peer_features & CEPH_FEATURE_FS_BTIME);
> >>> + kuid_t caller_fsuid;
> >>> + kgid_t caller_fsgid;
> >>>
> >>> ret = set_request_path_attr(req->r_inode, req->r_dentry,
> >>> req->r_parent, req->r_path1, req->r_ino1.ino,
> >>> @@ -2651,10 +2653,22 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session,
> >>>
> >>> head->mdsmap_epoch = cpu_to_le32(mdsc->mdsmap->m_epoch);
> >>> head->op = cpu_to_le32(req->r_op);
> >>> - head->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
> >>> - req->r_cred->fsuid));
> >>> - head->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns,
> >>> - req->r_cred->fsgid));
> >>> + /*
> >>> + * Inode operations that create filesystem objects based on the
> >>> + * caller's fs{g,u}id like ->mknod(), ->create(), ->mkdir() etc. don't
> >>> + * have separate {g,u}id fields in their respective structs in the
> >>> + * ceph_mds_request_args union. Instead the caller_{g,u}id field is
> >>> + * used to set ownership of the newly created inode by the mds server.
> >>> + * For these inode operations we need to send the mapped fs{g,u}id over
> >>> + * the wire. For other cases we simple set req->r_mnt_idmap to the
> >>> + * initial idmapping meaning the unmapped fs{g,u}id is sent.
> >>> + */
> >>> + caller_fsuid = from_vfsuid(req->r_mnt_idmap, &init_user_ns,
> >>> + VFSUIDT_INIT(req->r_cred->fsuid));
> >>> + caller_fsgid = from_vfsgid(req->r_mnt_idmap, &init_user_ns,
> >>> + VFSGIDT_INIT(req->r_cred->fsgid));
> >>> + head->caller_uid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(&init_user_ns, caller_fsuid));
> >>> + head->caller_gid = cpu_to_le32(from_kgid(&init_user_ns, caller_fsgid));
> >> Hi Alexander,
> > Dear Xiubo,
> >
> > Thanks for paying attention to this series!
> >
> >> You didn't answer Jeff and Greg's concerns in the first version
> >> https://www.spinics.net/lists/ceph-devel/msg53356.html.
> > I've tried to respin discussion in the -v1 thread:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230519134420.2d04e5f70aad15679ab566fc@canonical.com/
> >
> > No one replied, so I decided to send rebased and slightly changed -v2,
> > where I've fixed this:
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/041afbfd171915d62ab9a93c7a35d9c9d5c5bf7b.camel@kernel.org/
> >
> >> I am also confused as Greg mentioned. If we just map the ids as 1000:0
> >> and created a file and then map the ids 1000:10, then the file couldn't
> >> be accessible, right ? Is this normal and as expected ?
> > This can be a problem only if filtering based on the UID is turned on
> > on the server side (which is a relatively rare case).
> >
> > idmapped mounts are not about mapping a caller UID/GID, idmapped
> > mounts are about mapping inode owner's UID/GID.
> > So, for example if you have UID 1000 (on disk) and have an idmapping
> > 1000:0 then it will be shown as owned by 0.
>
> My understanding was that on the disk the files' owner UID should be
> 1000 always, while in the client side it will show file's owner as the
> mapped UID 0 with an idmapping 1000:0.

Hi, Xiubo!

>
> This should be the same as what you mentioned above, right ?

Right.

Let me show a real output from a real command line experiment :-)

1. Mount cephfs

mount.ceph admin@XYZ.cephfs=/ /mnt/ceph -o
mon_addr=127.0.0.1:6789,secret=very_secret_key

2. Make 1000:1000 a root dentry owner (it will be convenient because
we want to use mapping 1000:0:1 for simplicity)

chown 1000:1000 /mnt/ceph

3. create an idmapped mount based on a regular /mnt/ceph mount using a
mount-idmapped tool that was written by Christian.
[ taken from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/brauner/mount-idmapped/master/mount-idmapped.c
]

./mount-idmapped --map-mount b:1000:0:1 /mnt/ceph /mnt/ceph_idmapped

"b" stands for "both", so we are creating a mapping of length 1 for
both UID and GID.
1000 is a UID/GID "on-disk", 0 is a mapped UID/GID.

4. Just to be precise, let's look at which UID/GID we have now.

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# ls -lan /mnt/ceph
total 4
drwxrwxrwx 2 1000 1000 0 Jun 1 17:51 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 0 0 4096 Jun 1 16:55 ..

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# ls -lan /mnt/ceph_idmapped
total 4
drwxrwxrwx 2 0 0 0 Jun 1 17:51 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 0 0 4096 Jun 1 16:55 ..

5. Now let's create a bunch of files with different owners and through
different mounts (idmapped/non-idmapped).

5.1. Create a file from 0:0 through the idmapped mount (it should
appear as 1000:1000 on disk)
root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# sudo -u#0 -g#0 touch
/mnt/ceph_idmapped/created_through_idmapped_mnt_with_uid0

5.2. Create a file from 1000:1000 through the idmapped mount (should
fail because 1000:1000 is not a valid UID/GID as it can't be mapped
back to the "on-disk" UID/GID set).
root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# sudo -u#1000 -g#1000 touch
/mnt/ceph_idmapped/created_through_idmapped_mnt_with_uid1000
touch: cannot touch
'/mnt/ceph_idmapped/created_through_idmapped_mnt_with_uid1000': Value
too large for defined data type

... and we've got EOVERFLOW. That's correct!

5.3. Create a file from 0:0 but through the regular mount. (it should
appear as overflowuid(=65534) in idmapped mount, because 0:0 on-disk
is not mapped to the UID/GID set).

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# sudo -u#0 -g#0 touch
/mnt/ceph/created_directly_with_uid0

5.4. Create a file from 1000:1000 but through the regular mount. (it
should appear as 0:0 in idmapped mount, because 1000 (on-disk) mapped
to 0).

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# sudo -u#1000 -g#1000 touch
/mnt/ceph/created_directly_with_uid1000

6. Now let's look on the result:

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# ls -lan /mnt/ceph
total 4
drwxrwxrwx 2 1000 1000 3 Jun 1 17:54 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 0 0 4096 Jun 1 16:55 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 0 Jun 1 17:54 created_directly_with_uid0
-rw-rw-r-- 1 1000 1000 0 Jun 1 17:54 created_directly_with_uid1000
-rw-r--r-- 1 1000 1000 0 Jun 1 17:53 created_through_idmapped_mnt_with_uid0

root@ubuntu:/home/ubuntu# ls -lan /mnt/ceph_idmapped
total 4
drwxrwxrwx 2 0 0 3 Jun 1 17:54 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 0 0 4096 Jun 1 16:55 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 65534 65534 0 Jun 1 17:54 created_directly_with_uid0
-rw-rw-r-- 1 0 0 0 Jun 1 17:54 created_directly_with_uid1000
-rw-r--r-- 1 0 0 0 Jun 1 17:53
created_through_idmapped_mnt_with_uid0

>
> > If you create a file from a user with UID 0 then you will get UID 1000
> > on disk. To achieve that, we map a current user fs{g,u}id
> > when sending a creation request according to the idmapping mount to
> > make things consistent.
>
> As you know the cephfs MDSs will use the creation requests' caller UID
> as the owner's UID when creating new inodes.

Yes, that's why we have to map a caller UID to end up with the correct
value of a file owner.

>
> Which means that if the creation requests switches to use the mapped UID
> 0 as the caller UID then the file's owner will be UID 0 instead of UID
> 1000 in cephfs MDSs. Does this what this patch want to do ?

In my example we have a caller with UID equal 0, then the mapped UID
will be 1000. So, the file will be created with UID = 1000.

>
>
> > But when a user opens a file,
> > we are sending UID/GID as they are without applying an idmapping.
>
> If my understanding is correct above, then when opening the file with
> non-mapped UID 1000 it may fail because the files' owner is UID 0.
>
> Correct me if my understanding is wrong.
>
> > Of
> > course, generic_permission() kernel helper is aware of
> > mount idmapping
>
> Yeah, this was also what I thought it should be.
>
> There is another client auth feature [1] for cephfs. The MDS will allow
> us to set a path restriction for specify UID, more detail please see [2]:
>
> allow rw path=/dir1 uid=1000 gids=1000
>
> This may cause the creation requests to fail if you set the caller UID
> to the mapped UID.

Yes, that can be a problem of course. But it will only affect users
who want to use this feature and it doesn't open any security holes.
It's just a limitation of this approach. Unfortunately it's barely
fixable without massive VFS changes and until we have no real use
cases
for this combination of idmapped mounts + MDS UID/GID-based path
restriction we are not sure that it makes sense to implement this
right now.

>
>
> [1] https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/cephfs/client-auth/
> [2] https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/59388

Thanks, I'll take a look closer at that!

Thanks for closely looking into this patchset, Xiubo!

Kind regards,
Alex

>
>
> Thanks
>
> - Xiubo
>
> > and before open request will go to the server we will
> > check that current user is allowed to open this file (and during
> > this check UID/GID of a current user and UID/GID of the file owner
> > will be properly compared). I.e. this issue is only relevant for the
> > case
> > when we have additional permission checks on the network file system
> > server side.
> >
> >> IMO the idmapping should be client-side feature and we should make it
> >> consistent by using the unmapped fs{g,u}id always here.
> > To make the current user fs{g,u}id always idmapped we need to make
> > really big changes in the VFS layer. And it's not obvious
> > that it justifies the cost. Because this particular feature with
> > Cephfs idmapped mounts is already used/tested with LXD/LXC workloads
> > and it works perfectly well. And as far as I know, LXD/LXC were the
> > first idmapped mount adopters. IMHO, it's better to
> > start from this approach and if someone will want to extend this
> > functionality for network filesystems and want to map fs{g,u}id which
> > are sent over the
> > wire we will take a look at that. Because anyway, integration with
> > Cephfs is important for the LXD project and we are looking closely at
> > this.
> >
> > Kind regards,
> > Alex
> >
> >> Thanks
> >>
> >> - Xiubo
> >>
> >>> head->ino = cpu_to_le64(req->r_deleg_ino);
> >>> head->args = req->r_args;
> >>>
>

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