lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2023]   [Mar]   [18]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
Patch in this message
/
From
Subject[PATCH v8 02/40] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
Date
Shadow stack provides protection for applications against function return
address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the
kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built
for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it
is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but
without protection.

Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will
share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify
that at least one CET feature is configured.

Co-developed-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

---
v5:
- Remove capitalization of shadow stack (Boris)

v3:
- Add X86_CET (Kees)
- Add back WRUSS dependency (Kees)
- Fix verbiage (Dave)
- Change from promt to bool (Kirill)
- Add more to commit log

v2:
- Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx)
- Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx)
- Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave)

Yu-cheng v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a825bf031f49..f03791b73f9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1851,6 +1851,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT
(CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \
$(as-instr,endbr64)

+config X86_CET
+ def_bool n
+ help
+ CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT)
+
config X86_KERNEL_IBT
prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking"
def_bool y
@@ -1858,6 +1863,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT
# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f
depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000
select OBJTOOL
+ select X86_CET
help
Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a
hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX

If unsure, say N.

+config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK
+ bool "X86 userspace shadow stack"
+ depends on AS_WRUSS
+ depends on X86_64
+ select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS
+ select X86_CET
+ help
+ Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function
+ return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks.
+ Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not
+ get protection "for free".
+
+ CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020.
+
+ See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information.
+
+ If unsure, say N.
+
config EFI
bool "EFI runtime service support"
depends on ACPI
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
index b88f784cb02e..8ad41da301e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI
def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2)
help
Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler
+
+config AS_WRUSS
+ def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx))
+ help
+ Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
--
2.17.1
\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2023-03-27 01:06    [W:0.419 / U:0.044 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site