Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 25 Jan 2023 19:47:38 +0100 (CET) | From | Jiri Kosina <> | Subject | Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing |
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On Wed, 25 Jan 2023, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> Argument that it doesn't work? I thought that ship sailed a long time > ago but I could be wrong as I don't really pay attention to that stuff > as it's just vaporware :)
Greg, are you sure you are talking about *SEV-SNP* here? (*)
That ship hasn't sailed as far as I can tell, it's being actively worked on.
With SEV-SNP launch attestation, FDE, and runtime remote attestation (**) one thing that you get is a way how to ensure that the guest image that you have booted in a (public) cloud hasn't been tampered with, even if you have zero trust in the cloud provider and their hypervisor.
And that without the issues and side-channels previous SEV and SEV-ES had.
Which to me is a rather valid usecase in today's world, rather than vaporware.
(*) and corresponding Intel-TDX support counterpart, once it exists
(**) which is not necessarily a kernel work of course, but rather userspace integration work, e.g. based on Keylime
-- Jiri Kosina SUSE Labs
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