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    Subject[RFC PATCH v5 000/104] KVM TDX basic feature support
    Date
    From: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>

    Hi. Now TDX host kernel patch series was posted, I've rebased this patch
    series to it and make it work.

    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.com/

    Changes from v4:
    - rebased to TDX host kernel patch series.
    - include all the patches to make this patch series working.
    - add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear.

    Thanks,


    * What's TDX?
    TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines
    Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust
    Domain (TD) for confidential computing.

    A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its
    memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting
    Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.

    We have more detailed explanations below (***).
    We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****).

    In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the
    current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today.


    * The organization of this patch series
    This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support":
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.com/

    this patch series is available at
    https://github.com/intel/tdx/releases/tag/kvm-upstream
    The corresponding patches to qemu are available at
    https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx/commits/tdx-upstream

    The relations of the layers are depicted as follows.
    The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have.

    The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can
    exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD VM,
    create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and handle
    vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully.

    TDX vcpu
    interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\
    ^ |
    | |
    TD finalization |
    ^ |
    | |
    TDX EPT violation<------------\ |
    ^ | |
    | | |
    TD vcpu enter/exit | |
    ^ | |
    | | |
    TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
    ^ | ^
    | | |
    TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks
    ^ ^
    | |
    TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX
    ^ ^
    | |
    TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
    coexistence support


    The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy commit
    that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify where
    each layer starts.

    TDX host kernel support:
    https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.com/
    The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an
    independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functions
    this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module.

    TDX, VMX coexistence:
    Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the
    initialization of the TDX module.
    This layer starts with
    "KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX"
    TDX architectural definitions:
    Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions".
    TD VM creation/destruction:
    Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
    and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
    measurement.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction".
    TD vcpu creation/destruction:
    guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific vm
    and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX
    measurement.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction"
    TDX EPT violation:
    Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle
    secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation"
    TD vcpu enter/exit:
    Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state before
    entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit"
    TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall:
    Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected so
    that TD vcpu can continue running.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls"

    KVM MMU GPA stolen bits:
    Introduce framework to handle stolen repurposed bit of GPA TDX
    repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shared,
    it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access shared
    guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the guest
    page is encrypted.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits"
    KVM TDP refactoring for TDX:
    TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT
    entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX"
    KVM TDP MMU hooks:
    Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct EPT
    access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Unlike
    conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Instead,
    use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT.
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks"
    KVM TDP MMU MapGPA:
    Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/shared
    to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned to a
    private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall,
    guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to shared (or
    private).
    This layer starts with
    "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA "

    KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram)
    [PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private
    memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395
    Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. The
    patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM.

    (***)
    * TDX module
    A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to implement
    the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be
    loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assume
    that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized.

    The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon the
    new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the VMX
    architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation mode,
    and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL
    instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand
    (leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. TDX
    non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root
    operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure that
    no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and state.

    TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation include TD
    Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root to
    TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external
    event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be
    synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function.

    TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER is one
    of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Trust
    Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into
    various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module management),
    MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private memory),
    etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information.

    TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a guest
    TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high
    level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole,
    execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that MSR
    bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to have the
    same value for all VCPUs of the same TD.

    Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure of a
    TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and holds
    the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software and
    DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (such as
    TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary structures,
    such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc.

    Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt
    descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These control
    structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS.

    The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for TDs,
    2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs to
    define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3)
    Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcpu))
    tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();".

    *TD Private Memory
    TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the CPU
    using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption
    keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based on a
    Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to the
    encryption keys.

    In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical address by
    allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical
    address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME
    accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the shared
    HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host.

    During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be qualified
    as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the Guest
    Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX EPT
    (Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in host
    VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as
    with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exchange
    needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT
    functionality even for TDs.

    * Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code
    The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT
    pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private
    key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX
    interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (why
    "subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer time
    than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to minor the
    Secure EPT for the TD.

    This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface
    functions.

    * VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
    The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. For
    example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot copy
    the initial image to private memory.

    * TSC Virtualization
    The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values
    (e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is determined
    by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The current KVM
    owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs.

    * MCE support for TDs
    The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed for TD
    to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM. MSRs
    related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by
    paravirtualizing MSR access.

    [1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are
    available.

    * Restrictions or future work
    Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are
    addressed as future independent patch series.
    - large page (2M, 1G)
    - qemu gdb stub
    - guest PMU
    - and more

    * Prerequisites
    It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the scope
    of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is
    planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses
    CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=y, the TDX
    module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX guest
    life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use.

    Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, global
    configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are done.
    The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module
    specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine

    ** Detecting the TDX module readiness.
    TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availability
    and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID
    (HKID) assigned to guest TD.
    The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are
    - int seamrr_enabled()
    Check if required cpu feature (SEAM mode) is available. This only check CPU
    feature availability. At this point, the TDX module may not be ready for KVM
    to use.
    - int init_tdx(void);
    Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to use.
    - const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void);
    Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX
    isn't initialized.
    - u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void);
    Return global key id that is used for the TDX module itself.
    - int tdx_keyid_alloc(void);
    Allocate HKID for guest TD.
    - void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid);
    Free HKID for guest TD.

    (****)
    * TDX KVM high-level design
    - Host key ID management
    Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryption.
    It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions,
    u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and,
    void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid).

    - Data structures and VM type
    Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct
    kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. To
    identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) or
    TDX, is used.

    - VM life cycle and TDX specific operations
    Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operations.
    New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM/VCPU
    parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement.

    The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to the
    conventional VM creation.
    - Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported
    - VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM)
    - New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY.
    - New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM.
    - VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU)
    - New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU.
    - New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement with
    the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION.
    - New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial
    TDX VM contents.
    - VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN)

    - Protected guest state
    Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM VMM
    can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting
    exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as
    silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested via
    KVM API ioctls.

    VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations.
    Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redirect
    operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()".

    Operations on the CPU state
    silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write to
    CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0.

    . ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones.
    . TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because the KVM
    implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to back
    out those changes. Instead, skip the logic.
    . dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported.
    . exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore

    Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guests.

    - KVM MMU integration
    One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indicate if
    the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the bit is
    set). The bits are called stolen bits.

    - Stolen bits framework
    systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, is
    used.

    - Shared EPT and secure EPT
    There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure
    EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen
    bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve
    EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA.
    Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with
    SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private
    EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at
    the cost of extra memory.

    The following depicts the relationship.

    KVM | TDX module
    | | |
    -------------+---------- | |
    | | | |
    V V | |
    shared GPA private GPA | |
    CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT pointer
    | | | |
    | | | |
    V V | V
    shared EPT private EPT<-------mirror----->Secure EPT
    | | | |
    | \--------------------+------\ |
    | | | |
    V | V V
    shared guest page | private guest page
    |
    |
    non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory
    |

    - Operating on Secure EPT
    Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API
    during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and wiring
    it to TDX backend.

    * References

    [1] TDX specification
    https://software.intel.com/content/www/us/en/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
    [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX)
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-whitepaper-final9-17.pdf
    [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf
    [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 EAS
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-module-1eas-v0.85.039.pdf
    [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/intel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf
    [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/intel-tdx-guest-hypervisor-communication-interface.pdf
    [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide
    https://software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-virtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.pdf
    [8] intel public github
    kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm
    TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest
    qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx
    [9] TDVF
    https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF


    Chao Gao (1):
    KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o
    wrmsr

    Isaku Yamahata (73):
    x86/virt/tdx: export platform_has_tdx
    KVM: TDX: Detect CPU feature on kernel module initialization
    KVM: x86: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions
    KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure
    x86/virt/tdx: Add a helper function to return system wide info about
    TDX module
    KVM: TDX: Add a function to initialize TDX module
    KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural
    definitions
    KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions
    KVM: TDX: Add a function for KVM to invoke SEAMCALL
    KVM: TDX: add a helper function for KVM to issue SEAMCALL
    KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction
    KVM: TDX: allocate per-package mutex
    x86/cpu: Add helper functions to allocate/free MKTME keyid
    KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl
    KVM: TDX: x86: Add vm ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
    creation/destruction
    KVM: TDX: allocate/free TDX vcpu structure
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bits
    KVM: x86/mmu: introduce config for PRIVATE KVM MMU
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for
    TDX
    KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: make REMOVED_SPTE include shadow_initial value
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: refactor kvm_tdp_mmu_map()
    KVM: x86/mmu: add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Ignore unsupported mmu operation on private GFNs
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation
    KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA
    KVM: x86/mmu: steal software usable bit for EPT to represent shared
    page
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Keep PRIVATE_PROHIBIT bit when zapping
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: prevent private/shared map based on PRIVATE_PROHIBIT
    KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: implement MapGPA hypercall for TDX
    KVM: x86/mmu: Focibly use TDP MMU for TDX
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization
    KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory
    KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit
    KVM: TDX: Add helper assembly function to TDX vcpu
    KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path
    KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs)
    KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD
    KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs
    [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu
    exits/interrupts/hypercalls
    KVM: TDX: complete interrupts after tdexit
    KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit
    KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor
    KVM: TDX: track LP tdx vcpu run and teardown vcpus on descroing the
    guest TD
    KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched
    behavior
    KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection
    KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit
    KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI
    KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit
    KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI
    KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit
    KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT
    KVM: TDX: Add TDG.VP.VMCALL accessors to access guest vcpu registers
    KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV wrmsr hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV report fatal error hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV map_gpa hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request
    KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI
    Documentation/virtual/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX)
    KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU

    Kai Huang (1):
    KVM: x86: Introduce hooks to free VM callback prezap and vm_free

    Rick Edgecombe (1):
    KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for stolen GPA bits

    Sean Christopherson (26):
    KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX
    KVM: Enable hardware before doing arch VM initialization
    KVM: x86: Introduce vm_type to differentiate default VMs from
    confidential VMs
    KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes
    KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module
    KVM: TDX: Stub in tdx.h with structs, accessors, and VMCS helpers
    KVM: Add max_vcpus field in common 'struct kvm'
    KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure
    KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization
    KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow dirty logging for x86 TDX
    KVM: x86/mmu: Explicitly check for MMIO spte in fast page fault
    KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE
    KVM: x86/mmu: Allow per-VM override of the TDP max page level
    KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function
    KVM: VMX: Move setting of EPT MMU masks to common VT-x code
    KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value/mask on a per-VM basis
    KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX
    KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX
    KVM: x86: Check for pending APICv interrupt in kvm_vcpu_has_events()
    KVM: x86: Add option to force LAPIC expiration wait
    KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function
    argument
    KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper
    KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function
    KVM: TDX: Add a placeholder for handler of TDX hypercalls
    (TDG.VP.VMCALL)
    KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall
    KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state

    Xiaoyao Li (1):
    KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters

    Yuan Yao (1):
    KVM: TDX: Use vcpu_to_pi_desc() uniformly in posted_intr.c

    Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 24 +-
    .../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 33 +
    Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst | 360 +++
    Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 466 ++++
    arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 -
    arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 +-
    arch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c | 6 +-
    arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 +
    arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 5 +
    arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 38 +-
    arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 61 +
    arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 2 +
    arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 59 +
    arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 4 +
    arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 25 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 65 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 232 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 84 +
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 25 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 48 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 40 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 2 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 642 ++++-
    arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 16 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 10 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 155 ++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1026 ++++++++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 8 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/seamcall.S | 55 +
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/seamcall.h | 25 +
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 2337 +++++++++++++++++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 253 ++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 158 ++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 29 +
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 22 +
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 174 ++
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmenter.S | 146 +
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 619 ++---
    arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 235 ++
    arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 123 +-
    arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 8 +
    arch/x86/virt/tdxcall.S | 8 +-
    arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx.c | 50 +-
    arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx.h | 52 -
    include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +
    include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
    tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 59 +
    tools/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 1 +
    virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 35 +-
    52 files changed, 7142 insertions(+), 706 deletions(-)
    create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst
    create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx.rst
    create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/seamcall.S
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/seamcall.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h
    create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h

    --
    2.25.1

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